Introduction
The proprietary structures and organisational formulas -with a large presence of holdings, a wide diffusion of family properties and State owned firms, and a relatively low average firm size compared to that of other developed countries-characteristic of Italian capitalism are among the aspects most debated by historiography. From Grifone's formulation (1945) on the centrality of financial capital to Bonelli's arguments (1979) on capitalism and the State-controlled enterprise, up to the neo-Chandlerian interpretations of the same phenomenon proposed by Amatori (1995) and Chandler, Amatori and Hikino (1997) , the subject has passed through the various seasons of Italian economic historiography.
The control of a firm is the exercise of an influence over its strategic directions and over the choices used to materialise them. The subject of ownership positions of control and of the mechanisms which regulate the change in them has assumed considerable importance in all industrial economies, and an analysis of the relationships between those who have the wealth and subjects capable of managing it has attracted the attention of numerous scholars, who have discussed the efficiency of the various configurations (Grossman-Hart, 1986; Chandler, 1990; Kreps, 1990; Milgrom-Roberts, 1992) . Allocation of the control over firms and the rules which govern its changes have thus contributed to determining significantly the efficiency of the Italian economic system (Barca, 1994; .
The aim of this study is to reconstruct, using network analysis techniques, some characteristics of the structure of Italian capitalism during the post World War II period: in particular, ownership positions and the groups structure that followed from these, with particular reference to the relations between State-owned and private firms. It likewise seems just as important to examine in detail those mechanisms that guaranteed the consolidation and defence of the control positions of the group structures. Within this context, it becomes very important to determine the weight and influence of the special relations existing between groups of firms and the banking system, by verifying the effects that the 1936 banking Law had on the entire system. The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we review the empirical literature which, by using more or less formalised network-analysis techniques, has dealt with the subject of informal connections between firms during the second post-war period in Italy; in Section 3, we give a brief illustration of the source utilised for carrying out the study. Sections 4 and 5 contain the main results of our research:
in Section 4 the characteristics of the system are illustrated through the use of several indicators typical of network analysis, while in Section 5 we examine in detail the connections generated by the central actors of the system, the so-called big linkers. The paper concludes with some conclusive considerations.
Review of the literature
While the empirical studies which analyse the structure of Italian capitalism through a reconstruction of the connections between firms during the fascist period is limited to a couple of pioneer works (Zorzini, 1925; Luzzato Fegiz, 1928) , the panorama of studies available to us for the period following World War II is unquestionably more consistent.
Already immediately after the War, the Economic Commission of the Constituent Assembly made a very detailed survey of Italian joint-stock companies (Ministero per la Costituente, 1947) .
The study became the object of a political clash; but, thanks to the pressures of De Gasperi and of Gronchi, the Minister of Industry, it was never published (Barca, 1996: 172-178; Cassese, 1974) .
Nevertheless, the results were made known in numerous works, due to the commitment of one of the members of the Commission, Emanuele Rienzi (CGIL, 1948; Radar, 1948; Rienzi, 1947-8; Zerini, 1947a; 1947b; 1947c) . The main results of the survey consisted of verifying the existence, in spite of the presence of a large number of small share-holders, of a small number of large capitalistic groups which exercised a very strong domination over the entire Italian economic life by controlling -either directly or indirectly-three-quarters of the share capital of private firms. The concentration of capital was greatest in the mining, iron and steel, mechanical, electrical, chemical, and textile industries. Within this framework, due to their pre-eminent position, the four large electrical-commercial holdings: Edison, Società Adriatica di Elettricità (Sade), La Centrale, and Strade Ferrrate Meridionali (Bastogi), were particularly prominent. A well-knit intertwining of relations linked these companies to each other and to the other major State-owned and private groups. Rienzi himself also analysed -availing himself of techniques that were not particularly refined-the role played by a series of personalities whose presence on boards of directors was especially recurrent. He concluded that, «boards of directors do not fail to attract attention, because of their somewhat unexpected monotony, their rhythmic and cadenced precision: a true symposium of the same names, rotating only slightly around a pivot [Bastogi] , a collection table of that great Olympus of the investments that dynastically sustain the fates of production, value and profit» (Radar, 1948: 44) .
The permanence of the phenomenon of the concentration of the Italian capitalistic system was subsequently pointed out also by studies relative to the 1950s and 1960s. Again, the existence of a «power of availability» -concentrated above all in the hands of several financial groups linked to the former electricity companies that had just been nationalised-was confirmed, which managed a dense network of connections that branched out somewhat in all directions and towards all the other industrial sectors (Benedetti-Toniolli, 1963) . When analysing the effects of the nationalisation of electricity, we noted that this put an end to a system of industrial and financial relations founded on the great electrical-commercial firms which maintained close relations with the banking and insurance systems. The consequence of this was the emergence of a new order in which the great family capital returned to occupying a central position (Ragozzino, 1970) .
During the 1980s, two works by Antonio Chiesi (1982; -written within the framework of a comparative research project of the ECPR Research Group on the Intercorporate Structure (Stokman-Ziegler-Scott, 1985) -introduced to Italy the use of formalised network analysis techniques. The author pointed out the peculiarities of Italian capitalism, attributing them to the range and modalities of State intervention in the economy and illustrating the existence in the mid 1970s of a centre of the system inside of which two large poles cohabited, based respectively on State and on privately-owned firms 1 . Their integration was guaranteed by the zipper function carried out by several companies -such as SME, Bastogi and, to a lesser extent, Snia-Viscosa and
Tubificio di Brescia-on the boards of directors of which sat several of the major exponents of firms from both poles. Another aspect emphasised by Chiesi regarded the absence of the two most important private groups: Fiat and Pirelli, from the centre of the network. This exclusion, which was consequent on a more complex marginalisation of the private groups, to the advantage of the Stateowned groups, intervened after the electricity industry had been nationalised, and -in contrast with what Ragozzino held (1970) -owing «to the fact that the companies that still depend on family groups in general occupy marginal positions in the overall structure of the network» (Chiesi, 1982: 594) 2 . Chiesi's analyses also dealt with the classical theme of relations between banks and firms, observing that the absence of large banks -with the sole exception of Imi and Efibanca-from the centre of the system depended on the effects of the 1936 banking Law which, by separating the function of the collection of deposits from industrial credit, had rendered it impossible to reestablish those close relations between banks and industries that had so strongly distinguished the period prior to the crisis. Instead, a recent study by Giovanni Ferri and Sandro Trento (1997) 
The source
The source used for this work is Notizie Statistiche sulle principali Società Italiane per Azioni, edited by the Associazione fra le Società Italiane per Azioni (ASIPA). The project of making an electronic version of this source, which was started a few years ago, has given rise to the realisation of IMITA.db. The latter contains information regarding companies, boards of directors, and balance sheets of a large sample of Italian joint-stock companies for several benchmark years 3 .
The Notizie Statistiche includes all companies rated on one of the Italian stock exchanges, as well as those companies located in Italy which, at the close of the last budget, had a deposited capital in excess of a certain threshold 4 . In view of the characteristics of the data set, it must be said that the results obtained in this paper may tend to slightly overestimate the density of the whole system of interlocking directorates (ID), as there is a strong correlation between the number of IDs and the size of firms.
3 Data sets for companies and boards of directors are available for 1911, 1913, 1921, 1927, 1936, 1952, 1960, 1972 The data processing was carried out for all the Italian joint-stock companies that are present in the source, excluding Italian companies abroad and foreign companies based in Italy. As far as the directors are concerned, only those data regarding the members of a board of directors in the strict sense have been utilised, thus leaving out the members of Collegi sindacali 5 . The sample used in this work, based on three benchmark years, includes more than 100,000 seats belonging to almost 25,000 firms, for a total of more than 85,000 inter-company links. The names of the directors have been carefully standardised, so as to make them as homogeneous as possible. However, it is possible to estimate that the information on boards of directors contained in IMITA.db has a margin of error of about 1%, as is the case with other similar databases (Mintz-Schwartz, 1985) . These errors are mainly due to cases of homonymy, misprints, or shortcomings in the source.
Characteristics of the system: a quantitative approach
An interlock is the link that is formed between two companies when a person is present on the boards of directors of both. The individual who is the subject of this link is called a multiple director (MD) . In this work, we have used primary interlocks without taking into consideration either the directionality of the links or their strength 6 (Pennings, 1980; Wassermann-Faust, 1994) . In the first case, it is considered the role covered within the board of directors by the individual director, by assuming that the direction of the interlock goes from the company in which the director covers a more important position to that in which his position is of a lesser importance. In the second case, connections between two companies are weighted by taking into account the number of directors who sit on the board of directors of both. In order to understand the structure of a system by means of ID analysis, this must be studied from two viewpoints: one concerns the single subject -i.e. the director-, and the other concerns the firm. Since the establishment of a system is the result of an accumulation of offices by the directors on the various boards of directors, it is necessary to start precisely from this aspect.
The average size of a board of directors in Italy decreases over time, as can be seen from Table 1 . These values are also considerably lower than those observed in the period before World
War II, when they fluctuated around an average of 6 members per board (Vasta-Baccini, 1997 ).
However, it must be kept in mind that, for the first two benchmark years, the sizes of the sample were quite similar. Instead, for 1972, the sample was considerably larger, and thus included a higher number of small and medium-sized firms, which usually had smaller boards. As we will see further on, the decrease in the average number of available places constitutes a limit to the possible connectivity of the system over a given period.
An important measurement in the description of the system is offered by the ratio of MD to the total number of directors. As shown in The existence of a conspicuous number of MDs holding a total of more than 10 offices is indicative of the concentration of the structure. The total of the chairs held by these directors was always greater than 4. 5% (5.3% in 1952 and 4.8% in 1972) . Indeed, in 1960, this value reached its peak (6.3%), showing the existence of a stronger concentration in the system. These directors are commonly referred to as big linkers. The analysis of their behaviour which will be made in the following section is extremely useful for interpretative purposes, especially when the agents involved are seemingly of second-order importance or even almost unknown. As can be seen from If the system is examined from another point of view, that is by looking at the relations between companies, some differences appear over the period which do not emerge as clearly in the other analytical perspective (i.e. when the directors are considered). In the present case, it is important to measure the degree of cohesiveness of the system. To this end, some indicators, defined and used mainly by sociologists, have been employed. These are generally referred to as measurements of connectivity (Scott, 1991; Wassermann-Faust, 1994) , three of which will be employed here. The first is the traditional sociometric measurement of density, defined as the ratio between the number of links between pairs of units and the number of possible connections:
where L(r) is the number of real connections and L(p), defined as n(n-1)/2, indicates the number of possible connections. The density indicates the degree of overlap between the firms in the system.
Given the same number of firms, a greater density means closer relations between the sub-systems.
It can be noted that an increase in the number of firms causes a decrease in the density index: with the same number of links, the increase in the number of firms determines a decrease in the density.
The index D varies between 0 and 1, i.e. for L(r)=0 and L(r)=n(n-1)/2, respectively. These refer, respectively, to the extreme cases of a total absence of any link and to that of the realisation of all possible links.
The second measurement, known as interlock position ratio (IPR), as defined by Mizruchi (1982) , represents the proportion of directors on a board of directors who also sit on another board, relative to the number of places that actually exist on all boards of directors. This measures the orientation of the system towards the outside; it fluctuates between IPR=0 in the case in which no link exists, and IPR=1 in the case in which each available place on the board of directors gives rise to interlocks.
A third measurement, referred to here as CFF (concentration first four), represents the ratio between all interlocks and those generated by the first four companies graded according to the number of interlocks. Another proof of the weakening of IDs over time is offered by the decrease in the IPR index, which remained stable from 1952 to 1960, but then decreased in 1972. The CFF also decreased over the years under examination, falling from 1.43% in 1952 to 1.22% in 1960, and then to 0.93% in 1972. In adopting these indicators, it also emerges that there was a strong decrease in the connectivity of the system.
The dynamics of the system could be more extensively understood by analysing the structure of the company links disaggregated according to the sector of activity of the firms (see Table 4 ).
Table 4. Number of firms interlocked according to sector of activity
By looking at the overall data we have confirmation of what was observed previously: the number of companies with links reached its apex in 1960 (73.1%), while it dropped considerably in 1972 (to 67.6%), thus pointing out the existence of a lesser cohesiveness in the system, even if it must be recalled that the increase in the number of companies in that year could have influenced this result. These figures are lower than those observed in the 1911-36 period, when the share of interlocked firms also decreased constantly but remained at a higher level. In fact, in 1911 the companies with at least one ID were about 90% of the total; they dropped to 85% in 1985, while in 1936 the corresponding value barely reached 80% (Baccini-Vasta, 1995:231-2) . These insights are further strengthened by an analysis of the average number of interlocks per company, by sector of activity (see Table 5 ). This indicator, which is not biased by the increase occurred in the total number of firms, confirms that, in 1972, the cohesiveness of the system was considerably reduced with respect to the two previous benchmark years. In fact, the mean number of interlocks per company amounted to 7.8 in 1952, rose slightly to 8.5 in 1960, but then dropped sharply to 5.9 in 1972. Moreover, the decrease in the cohesiveness of the system is made even more apparent by We then disaggregated the data at a sectoral level. The sectors that showed the greatest connectivity within the system were those of financial intermediation firms -made up of banks, insurances, and finance companies-and of utilities. In fact, these two sectors had much higher values than all the remaining ones with respect to both the share of firms interlocked and the mean number of interlocks per firm. Within the financial intermediation sector, the position of banks and, above all, insurance companies was prominent. The latter, in particular, exhibited the highest values of the whole the system for all the three benchmark years considered. The trend of the indicators over time is particularly interesting. As far as financial intermediation is concerned, its values reached their apex in 1960, when a total of 96.1% of the firms in this sector were interlocked. Also the mean number of interlocks showed higher values in 1960, respectively with 23.6 links for banks, 18.6 for finance companies, and 30.2 for insurance companies. In 1972, all the three subsectors had their connectivity reduced within the system, even if it had occurred in quite different ways: both indicators dropped considerably as far as finance companies firms were concerned, while the decrease for banks and insurances was less pronounced.
In particular, the mean interlocks for banks is the same as in 1960, with 23.6, but there is a slight reduction in the number of banks interlocked. The mean number of interlocks per bank is slightly higher than in 1927 and considerably higher than in 1936 (Baccini-Vasta, 1995) , to indicate that its role within the system did not lose importance in the long run even after the 1936 banking Law.
The trend of utilities, within which the electrical companies were prevailing -until electricity
was nationalised-appears to be particularly significant. In fact, the number of interlocked firms in remained always connected with the rest of the system, but with the disappearance of the electrical companies, they no longer constituted its centre. It is interesting to observe that the enterprises operating in light industry (classes DA, DB, DC, DD, DN), within which small and medium-sized firms prevailed, generally showed values lower than the average. It must be noted, however, that these values were not as low as one might have been expected. This can be interpreted as an indication that a proportion of such firms did generated interlocks as well and, therefore was not disconnected from the rest of the system.
The classification of the top firms according to number of interlocks reported in Tables 6a-6c enables us to make several further considerations. For 1952, a strong prevalence of electrical companies can be noted, with fifteen presences out of thirty. At the top of the rank there were four companies -Efi, Coniel, Bastogi, and Ras-which, above and beyond their ownership structure, seemed to function as bridging companies between the major State-owned and private groups.
Among the remaining fifteen firms, there were five manufacturing companies, three finance companies, and only two banks: Icipu, one of the institutes founded by Beneduce, and Credito
Commerciale, a small bank belonging to the Pesenti Group.
In 1960, more than a half of the companies included in the top thirty in the previous benchmark year did not appear any longer, to indicate that a significant change had occurred.
Electrical companies dropped to nine, while the financial intermediaries rose to thirteen: five finance companies, four banks and four insurances. Manufacturing firms, in their turn, rose to six.
The overall impression is that the presence of bridging companies limited to the electricity sector was reduced, and replaced by companies -above all insurances finance holdings-in which the large electrical groups cohabited with the representatives of the other industrial sectors. In 1972, the rate of permanency decreased by only a unit (from 13 to 12) with respect to the previous benchmark year, in spite of the nationalisation of the electricity industry and the transformation of the former electrical companies into finance holdings. However, the utilities sector almost disappeared from the top thirty (with only Italgas remaining in the list), while financial intermediaries marked a further substantial increase: finance companies rose to eight, banks to seven and insurances to five.
The big linkers: a qualitative approach
An analysis of the behaviour of big linkers can be very useful for interpretative purposes. A close examination was thus made of the twenty most important big linkers who, in each benchmark year, accumulated the largest number of positions. The list of these personages, together with the age and the attendance figures for each one, is provided in Table 7 . Above all, it can be noted that As far as educational qualifications are concerned ( content of technical skills specific to any particular sector and are usually reached at a fairly old age (Martinelli and Chiesi, 1981) . In 1952, the sector most represented was that of that of the iron works and mechanical industry, with 110 positions out of 557, equal to 19.7%. This was followed by the production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, with 94 presences (16.9%), the chemical, petrolchemical and rubber industry with 50 presences (9.0%), and non banking financial intermediaries and real-estate companies with 48 presences each (8.6%). In 1960 the top position was occupied by public utilities, with 91 presences out of 521 (17.5%), followed by the non-banking financial intermediaries with 62 presences (11.9%). The iron works and mechanical industry dropped to third place with 58 presences (11.1%), and preceded the sector of real-estate activities with 51 presences (9.8%) and the chemical, petrochemical and rubber industry with 47 (9.0%).
What has been pointed out does not, however, seem in itself to be indicative of a loss of importance of the iron works and mechanical industry in the top echelons of Italian capitalism. In fact, it is due above all to the disappearance from the circle of big linkers of Ottolenghi and Luraghi, two Iri trustees who, taken together, combined 32 of the 110 presences noted in this sector in 1952.
This circumstance seems to have depended on a changed configuration in the chains of control within the Iri group. The impression is that, at Iri in 1952, a system of "long" chains was in force, with individual trustees who also occupied a high number of positions, while in 1960 they had passed to a system of "short" chains -to the point that, in that year, there no longer appeared any trustee of the State holding among the big linkers.
The 1972 picture showed up -at a distance of ten years after the electrical industry was nationalised-the almost total disappearance of the public utilities sector, which then numbered barely four presences out of 652. At the top of the classification with 105 presences (16.1%) was the chemical, petrochemical and rubber industry, followed by the iron works and mechanical industry with 86 (13.2%), the non-banking financial intermediaries with 81 (12.4%), the real-estate activities with 75 (11.5%) and the textile and garment industry with 48 (7.4%). Tables 14 to 16 sharply, from 21.9 to 12.6. This was a reduction which, due to its considerable size, appeared as a further sign of a decrease in the degree of cohesiveness of the system that existed during the second interval under consideration. (33) Capanna in the Iri Group; of Zurzolo and Jacoboni in the Efim Group. We could even hypothesise that there were personages "specialised" in a certain sense in this type of ID, as for example Vola and Luraghi, whose presences in 1952 were entirely concentrated -as to the former-in the Fiat
Group and -as to the latter-in the Iri group.
More significant, however, were the IDs that existed between independent companies. Among these can be distinguished above all those which united industrial groups with banks and insurance companies. Only a few of these interlocks showed a directionality -one that was considered typical of the model of finance capital-which ranged from institutes of financial intermediation [banks and assurances] to industrial companies (Hilferding, 1910) . This circumstance was not at all surprising, While, on the one hand, this type of ID reflected the changed-by-force relations between banks and industries that were consequent on the collapse of the mixed bank, it must not necessarily be seen, however, as an expression of the exercise on the part of industrial enterprises of a domination in regard to banks and insurance companies 11 . Rather, it would seem to be a case of the ID which Pennings (1980) termed "persuasive". To understand its nature, it is necessary to consider the fact that the role played by banks and insurance companies was that of collecting information on the general trend of business and on the situation of the individual production sectors, which in a certain sense was similar to that of the trade associations. Banks and insurance companies thus ended up becoming depositories of information that the top managers of industries could be very interested in having access to. On the other hand, banks and insurance companies could have an interest in opening up their boards of directors to the executives of those industrial enterprises which, thanks to their size and solidity, could become top clients of theirs.
Another type of ID consisted of the interlocks generated by personages who sat on a large number of boards of directors of firms belonging to different groups, but without having a "strong" or prevalent affiliation with any of them. Perhaps these were more interesting IDs which, most of the time, were generated by relatively little-known personages, such as Francesco Cartesegna, Bernardino Nogara, Mario Rossello, Tullio Torchiani, Enrico Marchesano, and Eugenio Rdaice Fossati, Giuseppe Martelli and Ettore Lolli. These seem to have been, so to speak, zipper figures, who could be comparable to the "network specialists" about whom Stokman and Wasseur wrote (1985) . In addition to making the circulation of the information quicker, these IDs seem to have performed -as Raffaele Mattioli (1962) had an opportunity to observe in his time-an essential function in guaranteeing the strategic coordination and stabilisation of the positions of control of the major private entrepreneurial groups.
The IDs which united banks, insurance companies and industries also contributed to maintaining the stability of the positions of control, just like those generated by the presences of the top managers of the most important industrial groups on the boards of directors of group companies (often corroborated by the exchange of minority stakes, through finance companies).
A final topic on which the analysis of big linkers led us to reflect concerns the relationship between large and small businesses and the presumed dwarfism of Italian industry. In fact, there was no lack of cases of big linkers who added up presences on boards of directors of banks, large industrial firms, financing companies, real-estate companies and, at the same time, of medium to small manufacturing companies. Thus, in 1952 the president of the Bnl, Corridori, was also a 11 Only in a few cases (those of the presence of Carlo Pesenti on the boards of directors of the banks of the Italcementi Group and of Giorgio Corsi in that of a small bank controlled by the Montedison Group) were these IDs manifested in correspondence with the exceptions permitted to the general rule that prohibited industries from having control over credit institutes. In fact, maintaining the major banks under the control of Iri -in the period after World War IIpreserved their managerial autonomy from a possible privatising which would have occurred with the money of the same, but to the advantage of the larger industrial groups. On this point, see Conti (1999) .
director of a small textile industry, the Torcitura in Pianello Lario (province of Milano); Carlo
Malnati sat on the boards of three small banks and, at the same time, on those of a fairly good number of textile firms and a food company, all in the province of Milano. In 1960, Guido Rossi, the future president of Consob, sat on the boards of directors of Pirelli & C., of two banks, three finance companies, and some ten small and medium textile, mechanical and food companies in the province of Milano. In 1972, Virginio Bernero -president of the Professional Accountants'
Association of Vercelli-was a member of the board of directors of some ten small and mediumsized Piemontese firms, mainly textile companies.
Also here, the impression is that we are confronting different types of IDs. On the one hand, there were "hierarchical" relationships, the expression of the domination of a large group (financial and non) over the smaller firms: this was the case of the IDs generated by Corridori and Rossi.
On the other hand, it seems that there were links of a different type. We can note, for example, the cases of Malnati and Bernero: both of them did not sit on the board of directors of any large companies, but only on the boards of a number of small medium-sized firms of the province of Milan and of Eastern Piemonte, respectively. Moreover, none of them was linked by any ID to anyone of the other big linkers. The impression is that these personages were at the centre of two networks of interlocks strongly connoted on the local level -which unwound parallel with the one based on large firms-an expression of the capacity of a part of the Milanese and Piemontese small and medium-size firms (above all, textile companies) to give rise to network relations among themselves, create alliances and accede to information and strategic resources, without this implicating a subordination in regard to the banks or the larger firms 12 .
The role of the banks
As we have seen in the preceding sections, during the entire period, the banking sector remained the one with the highest number of links per firm within the entire system, together with insurance companies. This characteristic undoubtedly depended on the size of the board of directors of banks, whose average is almost three times that of the other companies. However, at the same 12 In the same way -just outside the list of the big linkers-in 1972 Donato Cattaneo -owner of Nebiolo, a medium-sized leader firm in Europe in the production of graphics machines-was a member of the board of directors of Olivetti, of the Finanziaria Regionale Piemontese (Fiat Group), of Seimart (Gepi), of Moncenisio (Egam), of Seimm (De TomasoRowan Group), of Linotype (Eltra Corporation group -USA), and of the Fonderie Subalpine (Ferodo Group -France); but was also a board member of small and medium size firms in Piemonte and Lombardia, such as Challier, Nebiolo, Omac, Finigraf, Meccanica Sommariva, Riva Calzoni, and Pivano & C. Cattaneo does not seem to be the vector of a dominance on the part of such large groups as Fiat, Olivetti, Ferodo, Gepi and Egam in regard to the other firms he was a board member of. The impression is that the picture of the relations of these large groups with the smaller firms in the network was more complex that what was commonly believed: while these large groups exercised a hierarchical control in regard to an -even consistent-part of the small firms with which they were connected, there was a second group of lesser firms with which relations were better balanced.
time, it was also the sign of the peculiarity of the role played by the banking sector in the system.
As can be noted from The same remark can be made by observing the CR. It therefore seems that the banking system increased its own cohesiveness, right at the moment -subsequent to the nationalisation of the electrical industry-in which it seemed to be regaining its own centrality within Italian capitalism. 
Table18. Number of firms interlocked with banks according to sector of activity
where b ij is the number of ID between sector i and sector j; d i is the number of places on the boards of directors of sector i, and d j is the number of places available in sector j. The larger the index, the greater the intensity of the links between the two sectors. In the case of no interlocks, i.e. b ij =0, the intensity is r ij =0.
As anticipated, in 1972 we can note a decrease in the links of banks with the other sectors; but, in observing the disaggregated data at a sectoral level, we can advance several interpretative hypotheses on the apparent inconsistency emphasised above. Probably, the decrease mirrored both the general drop in the system's general cohesiveness, a good part of which was also due to the differing numerousness of the sample, as well as to -with the increased weight of small and medium-sized firms-the decrease in links between banks and manufacturing companies while, at the same time, those between the banking system and finance companies increased. That is, the banks inherited the role of the electricity companies at the centre of the system, while diminishing their connections with industrial companies.
From an analysis of the data presented in Tables 18 and 19, 
Conclusions
The analysis carried out confirms that the structure of Italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities also during the period following World War II. These originated from the rescue operations of the 1930s, which had enlarged the State's presence in the economy to an extent that had no comparisons in the other industrial countries of the West. In associating with the reassertion of the central role of private property in the national economic system, this circumstance posed in the first place the need for guaranteeing an equilibrium that would permit a coexistence between the area of State-owned firms and that of private firms, avoiding the prevalence of either of the parties over the other. To this end, it was necessary to guarantee the stability of the orders of control of the major private firms (Barca, 1997) , putting an end to the disturbances and conflicts that had distinguished relations during the early decades of the XX century (Mori, 1977) .
The stabilising of the orders of control of the major private groups, among which the large electrical-commercial companies stood out, was favoured by the 1942 Italian Civil Code (Teti, 1999) and pursued by resorting to a multiplicity of instruments: i) the pyramidal group, i.e. the organisation of production activity into an aggregate of legally-separate companies that are linked by chains of control, to the point that the capital owned by the controlling subject was concentrated in a single company placed at the head of the group, and that of the other share-holders was scattered among the subsidiary companies, so as to render ineffective their right to vote; ii) cross participations between head-of-group companies and controlled companies; iii) cross participations between different groups, realised through bridging companies; iv) exchanges of shares with insurance companies capable of supplying a cash support; v) the possibility, on the part of the directors, to collect the vote proxies of the small share-holders without any particular informational obligations or fiduciary duties; vi) the presence of statutory regulations aimed at discouraging climbings, such as the right of directors to refuse to enter the names of new share-holders in the members' register (Radar, 1948; Battilossi, 1992; Amatori-Brioschi, 1997) . These instruments were accompanied by the sharing of board members (Ferratini Tosi et al., 1983; Ferri-Trento, 1997 ).
The impression is that, in 1952, the function of IDs in this context could be explained through a network of bridging companies, divided over two fundamental levels. In 1960 the importance of the top-level bridging companies seemed to have increased significantly. Evidently, the incumbent threat of a possible nationalisation of the electricity industry as well as the pursuing of a conglomerate-type diversification strategy had induced the major electrical groups to increase their links with the entire spectrum of interests of the large industrial and financial groups, while the relevance of bridging companies internal to the electricity sector had been reduced. New top-level bridging companies -among which several insurance and finance companies were conspicuous-were added to those already in existence. The continuance of stable and elevated density indexes between 1952 and 1960 thus seems to have been accompanied by a reequilibrium of the necessary relations between electricity and non-electricity, with the latter included at that point in a position of equal dignity at the top of the system. Nationalisation of the electricity industry led to a dissolving of the old centre of the system.
Nevertheless, in 1972, a new centre had been formed or was in the process of being formed. Less strong and cohesive than the preceding one, it hinged on financial intermediaries: banks, insurances and a part of finance companies. The rise in the number of finance companies among the top thirty in 1972, accompanied by a contemporary one third drop in the mean number of interlocks per company may indicate that a bifurcation had taken place within that sub-sector of financial intermediaries. On the one hand, the major and well-established finance companies had been coopted within the new centre under formation. On the other hand, the considerable increase in the number of finance companies occurred between 1960 and 1972 seems to have been due above all to the reduction -as a result of the inversion of the economic cycle-in the self-financing capacity of the majority of industrial groups. This induced them to utilise this instrument -that is the setting up of new finance companies, often with relatively small boards of directors-in order to maximise their own capacity to incur debts, the net assets being equal, lengthening the corporate chain and optimising the management of the financial resources (Barbiellini Amidei-Impenna, 1999).
The in-depth examination made of the role of banks within the system arrives at conclusions that were similar to those proposed by Ferri and Trento (1997) , diverges from what Chiesi (1982; and Amatori and Brioschi (1997) upheld, and points out that the role of the banks remained important for the entire period, with the permanency of long-lasting structural links with both industrial and insurances as well as with a part of finance companies. After the electricity industry was nationalised, banks returned to being placed, together with insurances and the major finance companies, at the centre of the system, reacquiring -at least in part-the position that they had held in the 1920s (Vasta-Baccini, 1997) . However, it must be emphasised that, while the banks maintained overall a fundamental role within the Italian capitalistic system, the 1936 Law produced varied effects on the various subjects. On the one hand, formerly mixed banks were forced to make a profound change in their strategies, which led to an enormous reorganisation. On the other hand, the other banks -particularly the smaller ones-were less affected by the Law's provisions (Gigliobianco-Piluso-Toniolo, 1999) . Both Credit and Comit strongly reduced their connections with other companies, which passed from a few hundred in the 1920s and 1930s (Baccini-Vasta, 1995 ) to a few dozen, with a constantly downward trend, during the period taken into consideration.
At the same time, in 1972, some small private banking institutes, such as the Banca d'America e d'Italia, Credito Commerciale, Banca Provinciale Lombarda, and the Istituto Bancario Italiano, were at the top of the classification of the number of interlocks. Thus, it does not seem that we can share the assertion according to which «the interlocks between banks and non-banking companies
[…] involved the State owned banks to an almost exclusive extent» (Ferri-Trento, 1997: 415-416) , while, with the exception of Efibanca, these were, instead, placed in a more peripheral position.
The reduction in the degree of the system's overall cohesiveness does not seem to have been devoid of repercussions on the links between State-owned and private companies, even if the empirical evidence is weaker in this case. In 1952, the two poles appear to be strongly interconnected. Just think of the fact that 16 big linkers out of 24 sat contemporaneously on the boards of directors of State-owned and private companies, and that simply through the links generated by these personages, the companies belonging to Iri were linked to 15 out of the 20 most important private groups. In 1960, the situation remained substantially unchanged: the big linkers who accumulated presences in State owned and private companies amounted to 13 out of 21. Through these, the Iri companies numbered links with 14 of the 20 major private groups. Instead, in 1972, the number of big linkers present in both State owned and private companies -although remaining substantial-had decreased to a certain extent (16 out of 29); the Iri companies were connected to 7 of the 20 major private groups, while two other State-owned groups -Eni and Efim-were connected to 5 and 2 large private groups respectively.
Thus, the overall impression is that -differently from the results obtained by Chiesi (1982; using a different sample, according to which in 1976 the centre of Italian capitalism was marked by the presence of two large poles, one State-owned and the other private, which were clearly distinct one from the other-as far as 1972 is concerned the events following the nationalisation of the electricity industry had led to the formation of one new centre, that included both the State-owned and the private poles even if the ties between them were less cohesive than in the 1950s and in the early 1960s. Among the clues leading to such a conclusion we can underscore the circumstance that -also in 1972-more than a half of the big linkers sat contemporarily on boards of directors of both State-owned and private companies, while none cumulated his presences entirely within the State-owned sector. Furthermore, an analysis on the ten State-owned companies included in the top thirty for that year shows that seven of them shared at least a half of their directors with private ones, ranging from six out of eighteen for Icipu (33%) to nine out of twelve for Mededil (75%). And -what is by no means less important-each of them was interlocked with a high number -some dozens-of private firms.
Lastly, the paper has demonstrated that the phenomenon of IDs was not limited to the major groups, but also involved a part of the smaller enterprises. This is an extremely interesting fact, which induces us to reflect on another peculiarity of Italian capitalism, namely the presumed dwarfism of its entrepreneurial base. In fact, while the sharing of one or more directors with another company is an element that makes it possible to broaden a company's confines, we can assert that at least a small part of the small Italian firms was a little less small that what was commonly believed.
Perhaps also the scarcity of medium-size firms, a characteristic of Italian capitalism that has been observed quite often in the literature, could find an explanation in the existence of microgroups, gathered around a single ownership, which would make the model of the decentralisation of control less significant than is commonly believed.
